Corruption and anti-corruption research frontiers – where is the debate going?

Corruption became an important concern for development around 1990. Academic and operational-level research has evolved constantly since then. These authors give good summaries of the current anti-corruption debate:

Rethinking corruption: Hocus-pocus, locus and focus

The anti-politics of development: Donor agencies and the political economy of governance

Understanding what drives corruption – finding better theoretical explanations for corruption – remains a major challenge. Defining a useable theoretical framework for corruption is not merely an academic quest. We hope that understanding how corruption occurs will help us create and implement anti-corruption strategies and initiatives that work.

From principal-agent theory to collective action

Anti-corruption reform agendas took their earliest inspiration from analyses of corruption in bureaucracies. Robert Klitgaard came up with the most influential of these formulas:

Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability

It is based on an economic concept called the principal-agent problem. Bureaucrats’ monopoly power and discretionary freedom – or lacking accountability – increases the likelihood of corruption. The opposite also applies: more accountability, and less monopoly and discretion, should equal less corruption.  For many years, this model has underpinned the way in which donors have approached anti-corruption assistance. They geared support towards technical assistance interventions – believed to increase accountability, and to decrease monopoly and discretion.

However, interventions based on this model have had a modest success rate at best. This has led researchers and practitioners to explore theoretical explanations that go beyond the above principle-agent based formula. One newer track of work has instead focused on collective action theory.

Collective action theory starts by stating that low corruption is in everybody’s interest, but that we can only achieve it if people believe that everyone else will act honestly. This theory assumes other drivers than mere 

. It sees people’s actions as strategic, in that they depend on what they think other people will do. Belief in such 

 – rather than pure self-interest – as the most common driver of corruption has considerable support in human behaviour studies. Individuals are prepared to act honestly if they feel they can trust that others in their situation will also be honest.

Academics and practitioners are currently exploring the implications of corruption as a collective action problem for anti-corruption reforms.

Topics

To tackle corruption, we need to understand it


Marquette, H. and Peiffer, C. 2015. Developmental Leadership Programme Research Paper. (University of Birmingham, UK).

Development as a collective action problem: Addressing the real challenges of African governance

Approaches to influence effective anti-corruption work in development cooperation


Guijit, I., van Es, M. and Vogel, I. 2015. (The Hague: HIVOS).

World Development Report 2017: Governance and the law

  pages 65–71, 196–224.
World Bank 2017. (Washington, DC: World Bank).


Hummelbrunner, R. and Williams, B. 2010. (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

The case for thinking and working politically: The implications of ‘doing development differently

'
Akmeemana, S., et. al. 2015. DCD/DAC/GOVNET/RD(2015)3/RDI (Paris: OECD).

Do trustworthy institutions matter for development? Corruption, trust, and government performance in Africa


Bratton, M. and Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2016. Afrobarometer Round 6, Dispatch No. 112. 

Impact of anti-corruption reform efforts funded by development cooperation budgets

The academic and practitioner communities have long debated how to measure impact of anti-corruption reform efforts funded by development cooperation budgets. This links to taxpayers parliaments' desire to know aid funding leads to. 

 – a session in the UK Parliament where U4 gave evidence.

Taking the blinders off: Questioning how development assistance is used to combat corruption

.
Sharbatke-Church, C. & D. Chigas, 2016. Institute for Human Security Occasional Paper. 

Corruption is abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It undermines economic development and state security. It takes place at the highest levels of society – as grand corruption. Or you can witness it between officials and citizens in hospitals and schools – as petty corruption. The consequences are both financial and societal – linked to human rights, inequality, conflict, and more. Read about the conditions that facilitate corruption, and general implications for development programming. Anti-corruption efforts should strengthen mutually-reinforcing systems that include a range of actors, institutions, laws and policies.

Twenty years of anti-corruption – A ten part series

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Development cooperation

Anti-corruption basics

 invokes the image of a government minister secretly accepting millions from a company in exchange for a public contract, or motorists paying off traffic police to avoid speeding tickets. 

, large or small, are the most well-recognised type of corruption, but other forms also exist.

, practices where officials extend preferential treatment – such as access to jobs, or other resources and services – to their family members, or friends and associates. Or picture the finance manager who 

 company funds that had been entrusted to her care.

Abuse of entrusted power for private gain 

 – the leading global non-governmental anti-corruption movement. Whilst not without critics, this definition is widely used because it encapsulates three core elements of corruption:

Corruption involves a violation of norms of conduct or professional obligations – explicit or implicit – arising from formal or other entrusted duties. The notion implies decision-making without due impartiality; counter to public policies; or more broadly against the public interest.

Corruption arises when a person misuses the authority derived from all kinds of formal or professional roles, but also informal or traditional ones. 

This phrasing covers not only public officials, but also individuals working in the private sector, media, civil society actors, religious leaders. It also covers people such as 

 who hold customary authority. 

A company employee selling commercial secrets to a competitor is an example of private sector corruption.

The gain realised through corruption is private because it does not benefit the entity or the collective that the official is entrusted to represent or serve. 

. But the gain need not go directly to the official in question: it may also benefit a designated family member, friend, associate, or a political party. 

Also note that anything of value can constitute a benefit: it’s not only money and material goods, but also power and influence, and other advantages – even sexual favours.

Corruption always involves these three elements. However, it can take very different forms. The roles of different participants and beneficiaries can also vary considerably. For instance, in some cases of bribery, the bribe-giver is a willing, proactive party who seeks undue advantage. But in other settings, particularly those where corruption is 

, people may have no choice but to pay a bribe to access public services that they are rightfully due, like health or education. And public officials themselves may be coerced into accepting bribes by their superiors or clients.

The prevailing definition of corruption as abuse of entrusted power for private gain does not differentiate among its many types and patterns. Neither does it say anything about the incentives or pressures that motivate them. However, this definition helps us to distinguish corruption from other kinds of wrongdoing, eg discrimination or mismanagement.

The definition also helps us to define related concepts, such as 

. This is a situation where an individual must choose between a private interest, on the one hand, and obligations arising from entrusted duty, on the other hand. Corruption 

 involves a conflict of interest, but not every conflict of interest results in an act of corruption: the person may ignore the private interest and act as duty requires.

Frequently used concepts that describe patterns or dynamics of corruption. 

You can find these and more terms in our 

Essentials of anti-corruption I: The basics

The harm inflicted by corruption is globally recognised, including by the UN 

 calls on states to ‘substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.’

It is extremely difficult to measure the extent of harm that corruption leads to. One reason is the so-called ‘iceberg phenomenon’, meaning that only a small portion or corrupt transactions is visible while much more is hidden. After all, most corrupt exchanges take place in secret, and very few cases are ever reported or otherwise recorded, much less prosecuted and punished.

 damage caused by dysfunctional public sector institutions and distorted public services. Consider the difficulties in measuring the following dire consequences of corruption:

When public officials pillage state budgets or distort public spending toward investments that yield large bribes – like major public works – less money is left for essential services such as 

. When politicians appoint unqualified family members and political cronies to run public enterprises, the firms underperform. And as international companies tend to avoid environments where demands for bribes will increase their operating costs, the potential benefits of foreign investment may be lost.

Without access to quality healthcare and clean water, or when buildings collapse because developers have bribed their way out of complying with safety standards, people’s lives are at risk.

Corruption harms the vulnerable and perpetuates inequality

When officials in public institutions force citizens to pay for services that should be free, the poorest and most vulnerable members of society – including 

 and girls – suffer disproportionately. In low-income households, small bribes to get health care can cut deep into a family’s disposable income.

Courts violate the fundamental right of access to 

 when they only hear cases if parties bribe court staff and judges, or when they rule unfairly to protect the wealthy and the politically-connected.

 protection and responsible management of 

 suffer when powerful industry representatives bribe policy-makers or political parties to vote down necessary regulations.

Daily experience of corruption reduces public trust in state institutions and citizens’ willingness to participate in democratic processes. Citizens who perceive politicians as corrupt may not bother to vote in elections; engage in politics; or pay taxes.

Organised crime networks rely on corrupt officials to circumvent the rule of law in times of peace, and to supply illicit goods and service in times of conflict. High levels of corruption can exacerbate inequalities and distrust between groups, making prolonged conflict more likely, or pushing post-conflict societies back into war.

Glass globe and magnifying glass on dollars

A critical review of ten global estimates

The credibility of corruption statistics

It is clear that economic and human costs of corruption are immense even if we 

The conventional anti-corruption approach

Graphic with the components of conventional anti-corruption approach

Anti-corruption systems containing these components can be constructed at any scale: the national level, or in specific institutions, or even in particular programmes, such as development programmes (see more about the challenges for development programming further down in the main text).

The larger the scale, the more complex the system. 

National anti-corruption systems are meant to encompass a myriad of institutions and governance processes, and various segments of society in an inter-related and mutually-reinforcing network of interactions.

This approach to countering corruption has been the mainstay of anti-corruption efforts and is reflected in international anti-corruption conventions.

However, two decades of pursuing this approach has not resulted in the expected changes. The disappointing results have prompted a great deal of reflection and analysis, including  theme-specific findings and recommendations featured on 

For an overview of some of the lessons learned, see 

 – a series of short texts reflecting on how UK and the the international community has approached anti-corruption work since around 2000.

International anti-corruption conventions

United Nations Convention against Corruption

African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption

Inter-American Convention against Corruption

Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption

Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption

OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions

Examining underlying factors and conditions for success has yielded some of the most exciting insight about anti-corruption practice to date.

Many researchers have pointed to the challenge inherent in the pivotal role of leadership in constructing and implementing anti-corruption systems. This observation relates to the notion of 

, which is viewed as indispensable for success, yet cannot be assumed.

There is considerable analysis exploring the concept and the role of political will and the pressures that shape it:

behind-the-scenes calculations and deals to maximise political advantage;

informal obligations to donors, supporters, mentors, associates, kinship groups, etc.

Dealing with the challenge of ensuring there is political will for anti-corruption reforms  has long been on the U4 research agenda. A U4 Brief from 2010 

 to confront corruption. 

See also this 

Developmental Leadership Program’s 2018 synthesis report, 

For particular considerations for development agencies, listen to these reflections on 

Thinking and Working Politically Community of Practice

Researchers have also recognised the critical role of 

 in driving corruption by limiting individuals’ options when confronting it. Various informal constraints may apply equally to the top leadership, lowly bureaucrats, or ‘ordinary citizens’. For instance, informal social norms that value kinship ties can create pressures on public officials to extend favours to their extended family, and lead to more societal tolerance for nepotism.

Or when informal political party affiliations afford supporters access to scarce resources, they create powerful incentives for many people to join and maintain them, rather than dismantle these patron-client structures. Dubbed ‘informal’ because they operate outside the ‘formal’ or ‘official’ state laws and institutions – such systems can be extremely well-structured and hierarchical.

Consider, for instance, how rigid the rules and the structure of organised criminal networks are, and how effectively they can co-opt or even ‘capture’ and overwhelm the formal system of the state. In such a setting, the conventional, formal rule-based anti-corruption approach is unlikely to succeed without supplementary alternative strategies.

 topic pages contains additional conclusions and implications for anti-corruption reform.

See also the Basel Institute on Governance's work on 

, and summary findings of a Fletcher School research project on 

Other analysts have focused precisely on the strategic implications arising from these insights.They argue that to analyse and address high levels of corruption in contexts of scarce resources requires a different conceptual framework.

For instance, when membership in informal clientelistic networks – or simply paying bribes – is the only way to access scarce resources or solve other problems, corruption may serve a ‘useful’ function for most people. This ‘functionality’ inhibits incentives for change. Similarly, in settings where it is commonly perceived that ‘everyone’ engages in corruption to access scarce resources, it is arguably irrational and foolish not to go along, because it means losing out.

In both cases, there are few incentives to abstain from corruption unless: 1. there is an alternative, and 2. there is reason to believe that everyone else will do the same. Where such dynamics are in place, addressing corruption is also – as formulated in economic theory – a 

 problem that requires additional response strategies. This is in contrast to a 

 problem, which conventional anti-corruption approaches imply.

Collective action and corruption functionality

, and further elaboration on addressing the 

The challenges of transnational dimensions of corruption have likewise gained prominence in recent years. When corruption is driven by international dynamics – eg increasing global demand for natural resources – an anti-corruption response must look beyond national systems. It also requires addressing the complex and opaque global financial architecture that helps corrupt officials hide or launder their illicit wealth, and the role of donor countries in creating or sustaining such opportunities. U4 topics 

The above insights have generated new perspectives on alternative and supplementary anti-corruption strategies. They do not categorically reject conventional anti-corruption approaches. Instead, they highlight the complexity of the challenge and the relevance of factors outside formal governance systems – particularly the political economy and informal structures regulating the (re)distribution of resources.

 identifies the main trends shaping emerging policy advice. A one-hour video of four talks in 2021 on 

Signpost that points in three directions: this way, that way, the other way

A map of policy perspectives

How change happens in anti-corruption

The fact that an anti-corruption reform strategy must look beyond technocratic approaches is a common thread. By 

 we specifically include addressing weaknesses in laws, institutions, and governance systems through legislative and operational changes, capacity development, and other technical means. Anti-corruption measures must also respond to contextual factors – informal dynamics in particular – that both constrain and also create opportunities for engagement.

The importance of the specific reform context is broadly understood by now. Most practitioners recognise that good anti-corruption practices cannot simply be copied from one country to another. They must – at a minimum – be adapted to the new legislative and institutional framework, or they may not be ‘transplantable’ at all.However, the full extent and depth of requisite contextual knowledge – the political economy, the informal power relations, the societal norms – is only slowly becoming apparent.

Understanding the complexity of a corruption challenge, particularly the context in which it is situated, can appear daunting. Fortunately, there are tools to diagnose the challenge. There is both already-existing data and methodologies that can be applied as needed.

The resources vary in what they aim to do. For example:

Measure the scale or volume of corrupt practices.

Estimate the extent of corruption risks in specific institutions or sectors.

Identify system shortcomings that permit corruption to take place, which should be reformed.

Analyse the political economy and social dynamics that drive corruption and impact the prospects for reform.

Practitioners should use a combination of these diagnostic approaches to construct a multi-dimensional picture of the extent and character of corruption, and the factors that perpetuate it. Such in-depth analyses indicate the opportunities and constraints for reforms, and potential allies and opponents – all of which can facilitate a strategic, evidence-based approach.

In addition to describing the challenge, diagnostic data also provides a baseline against which it is possible to monitor the performance of anti-corruption interventions. Such feedback assists reformers in evaluating their effectiveness and adjusting the approach as necessary. 

Development partners can address corruption in multiple ways:

Preventing corruption in donor programmes and development aid

Development partners’ first concern tends to be safeguarding their programmes and funds against leakage and corruption. They typically have robust corruption risk management systems with provisions to ensure that funds are used to advance development objectives. 

Prevention measures at all stages of the programming.

For more information please see the U4 topic page on 

online course on corruption risk management

 for U4 partners and their collaborators.

Many development partners also support anti-corruption efforts in partner countries. This most often involves improving aspects of formal anti-corruption systems, or promoting broader good governance reforms that comprise elements of these systems. 

All of U4’s research and training aims to support these efforts. Insights are summarised above, and laid out in  the 2021 U4 Issue 

Reassessing donor performance in anti-corruption: Pathways to more effective practice

In pursuing development objectives in health, education, justice or any other sector, development partners should consider how corruption undermines their anticipated outcomes. Known as anti-corruption 

, the approach seeks to not only prevent the misuse of programme funds, but also tackle specific corrupt practices that jeopardise programme results.

For instance, a programme may fail to reach vaccination targets if parents avoid health clinics because providers demand bribes. To succeed, a programme must not only provide the vaccines, but also address the conduct of health providers.

Mainstreaming can be challenging because it requires combining two sets of expertise: 

 knowledge. There is a great deal of accumulated insights to assist practitioners in their efforts.See for example the U4 Brief 

 anti-corruption into sectors: Practices in U4 partner agencies

, or consult emerging sector-specific guidance on 

Also check out U4’s online courses for partner staff and their collaborators:

Addressing corruption in the health sector

Addressing corruption in the natural resources sector

Development agencies promote one dimension of a country’s foreign policy that may sometimes contradict other policy streams. It is not unknown that donor countries pursue an anti-corruption agenda through development programming while at the same time ignoring corrupt business practices by its firms operating in the partner country, or politically supporting corrupt leaders.

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