I'm a political scientist with experience from the Western Balkans. My PhD dissertation examined how patron-client networks interact with statebuilding efforts in Kosovo’s municipalities. I've worked as an analyst and consultant to various international organisations and NGOs, including the World Health Organization, Transparency International and Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation. I've also worked at the Cabinet Office in London and for a development NGO in Jordan.

I hold a B.A. in Modern History and Politics from the University of Oxford, a Master of Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance, and a PhD from the Freie Universität Berlin. 

A policy approach to the politicisation of corruption

Where corruption is politically embedded, anti-corruption efforts are constantly at risk of facing pushback and unintended consequences, or of being ineffective. To avoid these risks, we suggest a two-pronged approach revolving around direct anti-corruption interventions and more indirect accountability reforms

Tuning in to the politics of (anti-)corruption: astute interventions and deeper accountability’ for more details

Tuning in to the politics of (anti-)corruption: astute interventions and deeper accountability

Direct anti-corruption efforts involve targeted action on specific corruption risks and challenges. To avoid subversion by political actors, direct interventions need to become highly targeted, bottom-up, and chosen according to the viability of local political conditions, rather than due to donor preferences or preconceptions of what anti-corruption should look like. To do this, practitioners should:

Integrity-building programmes can be more effective by concentrating on sectors or areas of public administration where anti-corruption does not threaten the interests of power-seeking political actors 

 where there is some support – from citizens, businesses, or other groups – to push forward reforms. The 

 led by Mushtaq Khan and his team at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London said that, for anti-corruption strategies to work, they must be 

 by Uberti (2020) assesses whether an anti-corruption practice is either central or peripheral to the political stabilisation strategies used by political elites in Albania. Through expert surveys, the aim was to identify where organised opposition to reform was likely to be low enough to make reform feasible. The feasibility ratings are presented in Figure 1 below. The sectors believed to be most amenable to anti-corruption interventions include education, public utilities, health, and environmental regulation.

Figure 1: Estimated feasibility of anti-corruption interventions in Albania, by sector

Identifying a reform area that is politically viable is not enough; even sector-specific reforms can face pushback. And so, another important task for practitioners is to understand the political dimensions of particular sectors or subsystems. This can help galvanise actors and generate the core ingredients for reform: legitimacy to change, influence over others to make changes, and a capacity to expand a network of supportive actors. 

Groups must be motivated to ‘keep up the pressure’. Mushtaq Khan and colleagues stress how these kinds of coalitions can spur 

The Building State Capability faculty at Harvard University

 describe this as being about initiating, maintaining, and growing an ‘authorising environment’ for reform.

The heart of these strategies is about mobilising those who gain from reforms – that is, those who lose from corruption. Practitioners should identify who may win from reform, and who has the influence to change specific issues. Successful strategies do not always depend on persuading those in high office; critical mass can also shape action.

Coping with the politics of anti-corruption also requires skills and capacity that may involve unorthodox forms of support. One form of skill-building could aim to enable practitioners to take more 

 that include greater flexibility and emphasis on ongoing learning that may be better suited to cope with ‘political surprises’ as reforms play out.

 on seeing new opportunities within anti-corruption identifies further key areas of support relevant for coping with the politics of anti-corruption. As political backlash is a risk, one area of aid can go toward reinforcing care and protection structures. Interventions could provide resources for digital, physical, and psychosocial security. 

Funding peer self-help networks can help sustain reforms in the face of opposition, providing solidarity, resilience, information-sharing, and a sense of mutual care for members. The 

, a solidarity group for anti-corruption legal professionals supported by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), is a globalised version of such a network. A 

U4 study on networks of anti-corruption authorities

 suggests that there is scope to improve these kinds of peer networks.

In addition, efforts are needed to help support political accountability. The aim is to build up sufficient answerability and sanctions so that corruption is squeezed out of politics. In countries with a credible rule of law and with committed political leadership, then conventional accountability institutions –  the judiciary, parliament or other oversight institutions – 

. Yet, in contexts of high politicisation, these accountability measures could clash with ruling elites’ interests. We suggest alternative and more realistic approaches that can align with politicians’ incentives.

The list below summarises the policy options. These are meant as initial possible options, and their viability should be assessed country to country. They are based on the key criteria that there is empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of these interventions to build accountability and ultimately control corruption. We organise the options into three building blocks of accountability: access to information; new forms of collective action; and smart sanctions.

 
More equitably distribute information about the workings of government.



Support free press through promoting press plurality and economic sustainability.
– Support internet access and online spaces for social collaboration.
– Digitalise public services so that decision-making can be tracked.


 
New forms of collective action for the economy, public services and representative organisations.



Overcome the reasons why social groups do not organise for more accountability to generate stronger collective pressure for more accountability.



Collectively organise business around formal associations.
– Develop trust in key public services through long-term investments in nurturing strong leadership and management.
– Help political parties develop programmatic agendas.


Stronger sanctions mean corrupt actors may self-restrain and norms around accountability standards become internalised.



– Support the development of pro-integrity social norms, so that corrupt behaviour is socially sanctioned.
– Support domestic and international sanction regimes and frameworks.


Building accountability suggest a multi-sectoral agenda for anti-corruption: practitioners need to connect with other government departments, they need to be involved with those promoting democracy, as well as sectors such as welfare, media support, ICT, and infrastructure development. These practices are not about short-term programmes. Many of the options imply incremental approaches but require long-term and credible backing.

Corruption and anti-corruption at the frontline of forest conservation: Time to address the power structures

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Natural resources and energy

Politics of anti-corruption

Corruption is a highly political phenomenon because a range of corrupt acts may be 

. This happens when the spoils of corruption are sought and reinvested, not for personal enrichment, but to maintain and enhance a corrupt leader’s hold on power. This basic guide explains how a range of corrupt acts may be politicised and the implications for anti-corruption efforts.

When corruption is politicised, corrupt acts are used to extract resources from the public coffers, which are then reinvested in the structures, networks and tactics that politicians use to maintain and extend their hold on power. A 

 by Inge Amundsen, describes these interdependent dynamics of 

The most common forms of corruption used to extract resources from the economy and the population are:

(money or favours) paid to a political power-holder (in person, or to their family members, organisation or the ruling party), normally by national and international companies or private individuals. In exchange, the bribe-payers get access to eg natural resources, concessions, state contracts, or privileges such as monopolies.

is the theft or misappropriation of state assets (funds, property and services) by someone in authority in a public institution.

 is when power-holders either play an active role in concealing or intentionally misrepresenting facts (including their own involvement), or take a share of payment or reward for ‘closing their eyes’ on economic crimes.

 is the use of force, threats, harassment, or persistent demands to extract money or other resources from individuals, groups and businesses.

It is easier to stay in power when your opponents are diminished and your ranks of supporters swollen. When accountability is weaker, you can subvert the democratic institutional checks and balances. Power-preserving corruption seeks to achieve this through:

This includes some well-known tactics such as favouritism (or nepotism), patronage, and cronyism.

 can mean bribing the electoral commission and high court to give favourable decisions. Vote buying or ‘handouts’ is also a common practice in many countries.

 from judges, courts, auditors general, or anti-corruption agency commissioners is another tactic.

 dynamic. Bribes paid to avoid traffic fines or to access administrative documents can remain for private gain and there is no reinvestment of those resources in power preservation.

Corruption that is within networks, however, is often politicised. Networks can involve key players – such as politicians, government ministers, senior civil servants, and other elected, nominated or appointed senior public office holders. Yet, some of the most powerful ‘political’ actors may not even be elected – they could be businesspeople, military leaders, senior bureaucrats, or figures from organised crime. 

These networks comprise what the Democracy in Africa coalition describe as 

 in more detail, looking closely at how corrupt political networks span the political and private sectors. A U4 study applied 

 to map a corrupt network in Pelalawan in Indonesia and showed how forestry corruption networks are remarkably broad and far-reaching.

The organisation of politicised corruption can also span national boundaries. Political corruption in one state can be facilitated by 

international banking, consultancy companies, and law firms

. In certain cases, corporations, banks, and intelligence agencies operating from the Global North have been at the apex of structured corruption. Corrupt elites can also be strengthened by 

This trap can lead to far-reaching consequences for political systems. One U4 study that draws on research from Bolivia and Mozambique describes how the abuse of state resources for re-election 

. It can also encourage systemic institutional decay where the legislature, administration, and judiciary become subordinate to the interests of political elites, and therefore are unable to fight corruption. 

Ultimately, it can lead to the suppression of democratic institutions. The U4 publication 

Rethinking anti-corruption in de-democratising regimes 

demonstrates how corruption is an important part of the toolbox for would-be autocrats in their pursuit of unchecked power.

The flip side of corruption being politicised is that anti-corruption is also political, even though it is often presented as an endeavour distanced from local or global political processes. Interventions that aim to reduce corruption can be politicised in different ways, leading to unintended or counterproductive outcomes.

As anti-corruption efforts advance, the ruling elites who use corruption to preserve power will start thinking about how to break free from those constraints. The response will depend on their power and position and the techniques available to them. Powerful actors may be subtle, using their official position to obstruct anti-corruption efforts through inaction or disruption, perhaps at the same time as rhetorically championing those same efforts. Political actors can deploy 'roadblocks' to reform, ranging from simply not turning up to meetings, to publicly denouncing reform interventions as politically motivated.

Corrupt politicians will defend their vital interests vehemently, and sometimes violently. Extralegal manipulation beyond the law can also be part of the response. Journalists and campaigners are particularly vulnerable. A U4 note on 

 describes how judges and other legal professions have been attacked.

As well as tactics of inaction, disruption, and violent resistance, corrupt political actors can also hijack and weaponise the anti-corruption agenda and efforts. Anti-corruption commissions and special corruption courts, along with tax authorities, the police, courts and other institutions, can be turned into a weapon for private interests. In Rwanda, after she announced her candidacy for president in 2017, political activist Diane Rwigara was disqualified from the election and detained – along with her mother and sister – for alleged tax evasion.

When used in this way, anti-corruption efforts can backfire. The 

 outlines the risk of new surveillance technology being used as a tool for control, rather than to predict or reveal misconduct or power abuses. This U4 

 suggests that recent anti-corruption reforms have been critical to consolidating power in the hands of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party.

International interests politicising the ‘fight’ against corruption

International development cooperation is not isolated from economic, security and geopolitical concerns. Anti-corruption efforts are restrained by, and can be overruled by, political, security and economic interests of donor country governments. This 

 for corrupt ruling elites in partner countries.

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Corruption and anti-corruption at the frontline of forest conservation: Time to address the power structures

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Podcast

Corruption and anti-corruption at the frontline of forest conservation: Time to address the power structures

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David Jackson